Joseph Cofer Black (born 1950) is an American former CIA officer who served as director of the Counterterrorism Center in the years surrounding the September 11th attacks, and was later appointed Ambassador-at-Large and Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the State Department by President George W. Bush, serving until his resignation in 2004. Prior to his roles combatting terrorism, Black served across the globe in a variety of roles with the Directorate of Operations at the CIA.
Early life A native of Ridgefield, Connecticut, Black completed his B.A. at the University of Southern California in 1973. The next year he earned a master's degree in international relations, also at USC. He then was accepted to a doctoral program at USC, but left in 1975 to join the CIA.Steve Coll, Ghost Wars (Penguin, 2005 ed.), pp. 266-267; Cofer had friends in Southern California and made trips camping to Lake Tahoe, CA and Reno, NV."Ambassador Cofer Black Becomes Vice-Chairman at Blackwater USA (), Blackwater USA press release, Feb. 4, 2005.
CIA career up to 1999 At the CIA, Black trained for the clandestine service and volunteered for Africa based on his knowledge of the region from childhood travels with his father across the continent. Initially, he worked as a case officer in Lusaka, Zambia, during the Rhodesian Bush War. He then transferred to Somalia, where he served for two years during the conflict between Ethiopians and Somalis. He worked in South Africa during the National Party government's war against guerrilla movements opposing the apartheid system. While assigned to Kinshasa, Zaire, Black was involved in the Reagan Administration's covert action program to arm anti-communist guerrillas in neighboring Angola.
In 1993, Black transferred from London to Khartoum, Sudan, where he served as CIA station chief until 1995. This was at a low point in U.S.-Sudanese relations, due to the latter's sponsorship of terrorism and the harboring of Carlos the Jackal and al-Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden. Black oversaw the collection of human intelligence (HUMINT) on terrorist cells and support structures; toward the end of his tenure, he was targeted by Al Qaeda for assassination (see Woodward, Bush at War, p. 9).
In 1995, Black was named the Task Force Chief in the Near East and South Asia Division. From June 1998 through June 1999, he served as the Deputy Chief of the Latin America Division.Steve Coll, Ghost Wars (Penguin, 2005 edn), pp. 267, 271; "Ambassador Cofer Black Becomes Vice-Chairman at Blackwater USA ", Blackwater USA press release, Feb. 4, 2005.
Director of CTC (1999–2002) In June 1999 Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet named Black director of the CIA's Counterterrorist Center (CTC).Steve Coll, Ghost Wars (Penguin, 2005 ed.), p. 456. In this capacity, Black served as the CIA Director's Special Assistant for Counterterrorism as well as the National Intelligence Officer for Counterterrorism."Ambassador Cofer Black Becomes Vice-Chairman at Blackwater USA ," Blackwater USA press release, Feb. 4, 2005. Black's promotion was a part of Tenet's "grand plan" for dealing with Al Qaeda. Black was the operational chief in charge of this effort. Tenet also put "Richard," one of his own assistants, in charge of the CTC's bin Laden tracking unit. Black still headed the CTC at the time of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center.
Al-Qaeda strategy, 1999–2001 In December 1998, CIA chief Tenet "declared war" on Osama bin Laden.Coll, Ghost Wars, pp.436–7, and p.646 note 42; 9/11 Commission Report, chapter 11, p. 357 (HTML version). Early in 1999 Tenet "ordered the CTC to begin a 'baseline' review of the CIA's operational strategy against bin Laden." In the spring, he "demanded 'a new, comprehensive plan of attack' against bin Laden and his allies."
The CTC had produced a "comprehensive plan of attack" against bin Laden and previewed the new strategy to senior CIA management by the end of July 1999. By mid-September, it had been briefed to CIA operational level personnel, the NSA, the FBI, and other partners. The strategy was referred to as "the Plan."
... [Cofer] Black and his new bin Laden unit wanted to "project" into Afghanistan, to "penetrate" bin Laden's sanctuaries. They described their plan as military officers might. They sought to surround Afghanistan with secure covert bases for CIA operations—as many bases as they could arrange. Then they would mount operations from each of the platforms, trying to move inside Afghanistan and as close to bin Laden as they could to recruit agents and to attempt capture operations. Black wanted recruitments and he wanted to develop commando or paramilitary strike teams made up of officers and men who could "blend" into the region's Muslim populations.
Parallel with these developments, in November–December 1999, Mohamed Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, Ziad Jarrah, and Nawaf al-Hazmi visited Afghanistan, where they were selected for the "planes operation" that was to become known as 9/11.9/11 Commission Report, chapter 5, pp. 155–8, 168 HTML version. Data derived from subsequent intelligence interrogations of captives. Working with a Malaysian security unit, the CIA watched al-Hazmi and his companion Khalid al-Mihdhar as they attended a January 2000 Al Qaeda conference in Kuala Lumpur, later determined to be where decisions about the "planes operation" were made.Coll, Ghost Wars, pp. 487–88.
According to an internal CIA report on the performance of the agency prior to the 9/11 attacks, Black was criticized for not informing the FBI that al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar had subsequently entered the United States. In addition, the 9/11 Commission found that while Black testified before Congress's Joint Inquiry into 9/11 that the FBI had access to information on the two hijackers, the 9/11 Commission found no such evidence of this.
The CIA increasingly concentrated its resources on counter-terrorism, so that resources for this particular activity increased sharply. Some of the Plan's more modest aspirations were translated into action. Intelligence collection efforts on bin Laden and Al Qaeda increased significantly from 1999. "By 9/11," said Tenet, "a map would show that these collection programs and human [reporting] networks were in place in such numbers as to nearly cover Afghanistan."Coll, Ghost Wars, pp. 457, 466–72, 485, and p. 654 note 7; Tenet statement to the Joint Inquiry on 9/11, Oct. 17, 2002; 9/11 Commission Report, chapter 4, pp. 142–3 (HTML version); George Tenet, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA (Harper Press, 2007), pp. 119, 120.
During the summer of 2001, Tenet, Black, and one of Black's top assistants—"Rich B" (i.e. "Richard")—were active in conveying the dangers of Al Qaeda to the new Bush administration. At a meeting with National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice and others on July 10, 2001, "Rich" predicted a "spectacular" terrorist attack against US interests "in the coming weeks or months" ... "Multiple and simultaneous attacks are possible." After the meeting, "Rich and Cofer congratulated each other," feeling that at last the CIA had gotten the full attention of the administration. At an internal CIA update in late July, "Rich" dramatically predicted, "They're coming here!" (i.e. the United States).George Tenet, At The Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA (Harper Press, 2007), pp. 145, 149, 150–3, 158.
One of the ways by which CIA/CTC surveilled Osama bin Laden in his Afghan base was the Predator reconnaissance drone. A joint CIA-Air Force program of flights in autumn 2000 (dubbed "Afghan Eyes") produced probable sightings of the Al Qaeda leader. Black became a "vocal advocate" of arming the aircraft with missiles to target bin Laden and other Al Qaeda leaders. Throughout 2001, Black and "Richard" continued to press for Predators armed with adapted Hellfire anti-tank missiles. Legal and technical issues delayed the program. Black urged Tenet to promote the matter at the long-awaited Cabinet-level Principals Committee meeting on terrorism of September 4, 2001. The CIA chief did so. The CIA was authorized to "deploy the system with weapons-capable aircraft."
September 11, 2001 After the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, some CTC staff refused an order to evacuate the CIA headquarters at Langley. This included the shift of the Global Response Center on the exposed sixth floor, which Black would eventually argue had "a key function in a crisis like this." CIA director Tenet finally accepted that Black wouldn't leave, and that their lives would be put at risk.Tenet, At The Center of the Storm, pp. 164-65. The conversation is a virtual replica of that given in Bob Woodward, Bush At War (2002/3) (Publisher's extract from chapter 1).
The CTC obtained passenger lists from the planes that had been turned into weapons that morning, noting the presence of Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi. This was the first "absolute proof" that the attacks were an Al Qaeda plot.Tenet, At The Center of the Storm, p. 167. The CTC had first come across the names in connection with potential terrorist activity in the winter of 1999–2000 (see above).
Despite his well-known statement "after 9/11 the gloves come off", Black was cautious about legal authorizations. He compared vague hints dropped by the president, of a nature that might not carry immunity, to Henry II's indirect order: "Who will rid me of this meddlesome priest?".
Post 9/11: Global War on Terror On September 13, 2001, Black briefed President George W. Bush in the White House Situation Room and outlined a CIA-led campaign in Afghanistan in which small teams of CIA officers and Green Berets would work with the Northern Alliance to topple the Taliban government and expel Al Qaeda. Black told Bush: "When we're through with them, they will have flies walking across their eyeballs."Harnden, Toby, "First Casualty: The Untold Story of the CIA Mission to Avenge 9/11". Little, Brown, 2021. p. 46 Black told Bush that the CIA's planning efforts had put them in a better position to respond after the attacks. Tenet later said,
How could [an intelligence] community without a strategic plan tell the president of the United States just four days after 9/11 how to attack the Afghan sanctuary and operate against al-Qa'ida in ninety-two countries around the world?Tenet, At the Center of the Storm, pp. 121-2.
A "war council" (i.e. a restricted group of the National Security Council) chaired by President Bush at Camp David was convened on September 15, 2001. Black was present. Tenet proposed first to send CIA teams into Afghanistan to collect intelligence and mount covert operations. The teams would act jointly with military Special Operations units. President Bush later praised this proposal, saying it had been "a turning point in his thinking."9/11 Commission Report, chapter 10, p. 332 (HTML version; Tenet, At the Center of the Storm, p. *.)Woodward, Bush at War, pp. 52.
Black and Armitage then flew to Moscow to seek help from Russian diplomatic and intelligence officers, as Afghanistan was in their sphere of influence. The Russians indicated their willingness to help and would not obstruct CIA activities. They warned Black about guerilla fighters being a major problem for the Russian army in Afghanistan, and provided a team to the CIA to assist with extensive on-the-ground intelligence, especially about topography and caves.Woodward, Bush at War, p. 103.
The CIA geared up to take the lead in the attack on Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. The Northern Afghanistan Liaison Team, led by Gary Schroen, entered the country on September 26, 2001. A new branch was added to the CTC—CTC Special Operations, or CTC/SO. Hank Crumpton, the former head of CTC operations, was recalled to head it. Black told him, "Your mission is to find al-Qa'ida, engage it, and destroy it."Tenet, At The Center Of The Storm, pp. 211, 217, 221-3.